# Safe Policy Migrations

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# 2016 - Introducing Todos!

	Todos	Q Search	12 + 🕩
ñ	To do 12 Done 32		Mark all as done
.▲ £29	Project v Author v Type v Action v		
<b>2</b>	GitLab.com / blog-posts		
0	Dmitriy Zaporozhets mentioned you on issue #153 · 18 minutes ago I think @nearlythere is right. Just make an overview of css structure but mostly focus on how to make easy change a	nd contribute back	Done
Г <u>.</u> 0	GitLab.com / www-gitlab-com		
2	Chad Malchow assigned you merge request !1624 · about 19 hours ago WIP: 2016-03-15-GitLab-Enterprise-Edition-Price-Change		Done
	Ivan Nemytchenko assigned you merge request !1617 · a day ago		Done

### 2019 - Leak discovered in Todos





djrenren directly addressed you on issue #1 "Secret issue. Don't Leak" at tech-corp / secret-project · 19 hours ago

Done

@hackerxx seems like a shady character

### Buggy permissions check

#### todo\_service.rb

```
def reject_users_without_access(users, parent, target)
316
317
          if target.is_a?(Note) && target.for_issuable?
318
            target = target.noteable
319
         end
320
          if target.is_a?(Issuable)
321
322
            select_users(users, :"read_#{target.to_ability_name}", target)
323
         else
324
            select_users(users, :read_project, parent)
325
          end
326
       end
```

## Buggy permissions check

#### todo\_service.rb

	<pre>def reject_users_without_access(users, parent, target)</pre>
	<pre>if target.is_a?(Note) &amp;&amp; target.for_issuable?</pre>
	target = target.noteable
	end
	<pre>if target.is_a?(Issuable)</pre>
322	select_users(users, :"read_#{target. <b>to_ability_name</b> }", target)
	else
	<pre>select_users(users, :read_project, parent)</pre>
	end
326	end

# What went wrong?

### Update induced leakage



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### Update induced leakage



New feature required reimplementation of security checks

New checks were subtly incomplete

How can we prevent update-induced leakage?

Find & fix bugs

### Teach good practices



### How can we prevent update-induced leakage?



### Decrease the amount of code we have to trust



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#### Single statement of policy for each resource

Maintains security in the presence of most bugs

### Policy Description Languages - Not a new idea





### How it would fix this GitLab Example



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New app code can't leak old data!

# Runtime protection is not enough

### Runtime protection is not enough - Example



### Let's add a bio to GitLab profiles

### Migrations can also leak

#### ALTER TABLE User ADD bio TEXT;



UPDATE User SET bio = CONCAT('Hi, I'm ', username, '. Email me: ', email)

### We leaked user emails!

## We need a unified approach

A DSL to:

- Define the data model
- Specify policies on that model
- Express & reason about changes to both

### What do data models and policies look like



### What do migrations look like

```
User.addField("bio", String, u ->
```

```
"Hi, I'm " + u.name + ". Email me: " + u.email);
```

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```

#### **All Operations**

.addField addColle .removeField removeCo .changeField renameCo .forEach .create .update

addCollection removeCollection renameCollection

### Maintaining policies across migrations

Migrations don't run as single users

Enforcing policies mid-migration would be difficult

Allow all migrations, generate an "at least as strict" policy

### Information flow in migrations

```
User.addField("bio", String, u ->
```

"Hi, I'm " + u.name + ". Email me: " + u.email);

Sources

Sink



Field renamed

Rename "contact" to "email"

Field renamed - Replace references with new name

Rename "contact" to "email"

Field renamed - Replace references with new name

Rename "contact" to "email"

Data relocated

Move "email" to a Profile which is 1:1 with User

Field renamed - Replace references with new name

Rename "contact" to "email"

Data relocated - Replace references with traversals

Move "email" to a Profile which is 1:1 with User

Field renamed - Replace references with new name

Rename "contact" to "email"

Data relocated - Replace references with traversals

Move "email" to a Profile which is 1:1 with User

Data modified

Increase User.permission\_rank by1

Field renamed - Replace references with new name

Rename "contact" to "email"

Data relocated - Replace references with traversals

Move "email" to a Profile which is 1:1 with User

Data modified - Replace references with inverse operation

Increase User.permission\_rank by1

### Preventing leaks due to policy refactoring



### New policy is "at least as strict"

### Where are we now?

#### Done

MVP of policy specification

Verifying policy changes w/ SMT

A few simple migrations

#### <u>To-do</u>

Expand policy language

Migration flow analysis



Explicit policy descriptions prevent leaks in app code

### We also need to prevent leaks due to migrations

Our DSL addresses both problems